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Abstract 
There is clear evidence that human beings have contributed to climate 
change through their patterns of consumption, and since we are part of the 
problem then we must be part of the solution.  People say that they are prepared 
to adapt their behaviour to ameliorate the effects of climate change, but 
numerous studies have found that little behaviour change actually occurs. This 
experimental study investigates this issue, by focussing on explicit (self report) 
attitudes, and implicit (automatic) attitudes to various consumer brands with 
differing environmental consequences in a behavioural choice task.  We found 
firstly, in line with previous research, that human beings have reflective 
attitudes and more unconscious and automatic attitudes that are ‘dissociated’.  
In terms of consumer choice of brands, we found that consumers were 
particularly sensitive to both big brand information and value in their selection 
of products, particularly under time pressure.  Organic/eco brands were, 
however, much less favoured, especially under any further time pressure, where 
processes that are more automatic are evident.  Carbon footprint information 
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influenced choice even under time pressure but only in those consumers with a 
strong positive implicit attitude to carbon footprint.  Human beings may well 
have a ‘divided self’ (reflective versus unconscious attitudes) when it comes to 
the environment/climate change, and this underlying dissociation might be 
critical to their behaviour as consumers.  This concept may help us understand 
why relatively little has changed thus far with regard to more sustainable 
consumption, but might open up new thinking about how we might attempt to 
promote change in the future.            
 
Introduction  
Climate change represents the greatest threat we, as a species, have faced.  
The scientific evidence for the existence of climate change and its likely effects 
on life itself is overwhelming; indeed, despite what critics like the Global 
Warming Policy Foundation say, it is rare to see such a scientific consensus on 
anything (see IPCC, 2014). According to the Stern Review, which reported a 
decade or so ago: ‘Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for 
people around the world.’ Stern’s review continued: ‘A rise in global 
temperature will have: severe and widespread impacts, major risks to global 
food production, and more extreme fluctuations in weather, including droughts, 
flooding and storms.’  However, Stern (2006) also made another critical point - 
‘Human activities are a major driver of this rapid change in our 
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climate…particularly patterns of consumption and energy use, driven by 
consumer demand for higher standards of living.’  In other words, we as 
consumers are playing a major role in the creation of this problem.  One 
argument is that if we are part of the problem, then we must be part of the 
solution.  This point has not been lost on agencies like the United Nations, 
selected governments around the world and many leading multinationals, indeed 
the very same multinationals that have made it their mission to promote and 
then satisfy this increasing consumer demand. 
Take Unilever, for example, one of the top ten global companies in terms of 
both turnover and reach.  This company reports an annual turnover of around 
£40 billion with its products sold in 190 countries across the globe (Unilever 
Sustainable Living Plan, 2013).  It proudly boasts that 2 billion times a day, a 
consumer somewhere on the globe uses one of their products.  The Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI) of this enormous company are, not surprisingly, 
primarily financial – they are currently aiming for 5% growth with fewer, 
bigger innovations.  They aim to win a higher proportion of market share, and 
want to build their brands and win consumer preference.  They are choosing to 
focus on premium products with higher margins.  However, they recognize the 
essential dilemma that they (and we) are all facing.  In their ‘Sustainable Living 
Plan’, they say that ‘We are living in a world where temperatures are rising; 
water is scarce, energy expensive, food supplies uncertain and the gap between 
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rich and poor increasing.’ (Unilever Sustainable Living Plane, 2013, p. 1.)  
Their conclusion is that ‘Business must be part of the solution.  Sustainable, 
equitable growth is the only acceptable business model’ and that ‘in order to 
live within the natural limits of the planet we will have to decouple growth from 
environmental impact’.  Therefore, they have another KPI, which is not about 
finance, but about the environment.  As a company, they aim to ‘halve the 
greenhouse gas impact of our products across the lifecycle by 2020.’ (2013, 
p.16)  In pursuit of this goal, they have reduced greenhouse gas emissions from 
their manufacturing chain and reduced deforestation.  They have opted for more 
environmentally friendly sourcing of raw materials.  They have doubled their 
use of renewable energy and produced concentrated liquids and powders.  They 
have reduced greenhouse gas emissions from transport and reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions from refrigeration.  They have also reduced employee travel.  So 
what effect did these various initiatives have on their environmental impact?  
Their report concludes: ‘Our greenhouse gas footprint impact per consumer has 
….increased by around 5% since 2010.’ (2013, p.16)  They then attempt to 
explain what has gone wrong.  ‘We have made good progress in those areas 
under our control but…the big challenges are those areas not under our direct 
control like…..consumer behaviour.’ 
It would seem that the problem essentially is us, as consumers, and how we 
behave.  It is what we do with these good environmental products (in terms of 
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our patterns of usage and our generation of waste, our fondness for 
refrigeration, the length of the showers we choose to take, our use of energy 
etc.) and why we choose the environmentally unfriendly alternatives in the first 
place.  So why might this be? 
There is, of course, a multiplicity of possible reasons.  The effects of climate 
change are (unfortunately from some points of view) less personal than other 
looming disasters, and will primarily affect future generations (Hansen et al, 
2013).  Climate change cannot be reversed immediately and we know that 
delayed contingent reinforcement and punishment is highly problematic for 
behaviour change (see Skinner, 1938).  Climate change also requires a ‘global 
response’, but because it is a global issue (Walker and King, 2008), involving 
many different countries, we can expect a diffusion of responsibility, and social 
loafing, leaving it to others.  It also seems that quite simple experiences can 
occasion quite significant shifts of responsibility at the level of the individual 
(Beattie, McGuire and Sale, 2010).  For example, when experimental 
participants in the U.K. watched sections of Al Gore’s film ‘An Inconvenient 
Truth’ highlighting China’s industrialization and its dirty power stations, then 
they were significantly more likely to agree to statements like ‘It is the 
responsibility of other countries, not the U.K., to reduce climate change’ and 
‘Climate change is a problem to be solved by future generations.’  This all 
happened because they had been briefly reminded of China’s huge coal reserves 
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and its use of old technology in coal-burning technology (see also Beattie, 2010, 
p.221; Beattie, 2011).  Uncertainty about the time course of climate change 
undoubtedly also play an important role with powerful lobbies behind this 
uncertainty (according to the BBC, the US fossil fuel giants, the Koch Brothers, 
are spending $900 million on advertising to put their case), rather similar to the 
uncertainty about the relationship between smoking and lung cancer generated 
by the tobacco industry in the nineteen fifties, sixties and seventies (Conway 
and Oreskes, 2010). 
Then again, climate change is complicated; it requires an understanding of 
basic physics (or perhaps more than basic physics) to understand the 
mechanisms underpinning it (without very high degrees of simplification), the 
public even find some of the proposed solutions far too complicated in terms of 
the basic physics involved.  Take, carbon labeling, for example, which is the 
practice of communicating the greenhouse gas (GHQ) emissions associated 
with the life cycle of a product or service.  This process of enhancing product 
information to promote more sustainable consumption has been stressed in a 
variety of top-level policy reports (see Upham, Dendler and Bleda, 2011).  
These include UN Agenda 21 United Nations (1992), the EU Sustainable 
Consumption and Production Action Plan (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008) the UK Sustainable Development Report (Government, 
2005), and the United States Environmental Protection Agency 1998).  
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However, Upham et al (2011) tested the public’s reaction to carbon labeling in a 
series of focus groups and found that they had genuine difficulty in 
understanding how a gas (or gases) could even be expressed in terms of its mass 
(260g of carbon etc.), which, of course, is the essence of carbon labeling .  They 
also had severe difficulty in linking an emissions figure to its environmental 
impact.   
Then there is the emotional valence of ‘global warming’ (Beattie, 2010), 
which sounds almost benign and, at the opposite extreme, with climate change 
we probably have something, which is too catastrophic to contemplate.  
Therefore, in order to maintain some degree of psychological stability and to 
remain relatively optimistic about the future, we avoid contemplating climate 
change whenever possible (Ehrenreich, 2009).  We may even subconsciously 
avoid seeing images connected with climate change as we do with other sorts of 
negative images (Isaacowitz 2006, 2007; Beattie and McGuire, 2012). 
Thus, for a myriad of reasons, it is clearly going to be difficult to get the 
public to change their behaviour in the light of this particular threat.  However, 
some have maintained a degree of optimism despite all of this, and they have 
argued that it may be difficult to promote major behavioral change, but not 
impossible.  These proponents of behaviour change suggest that in order to do 
this successfully we have to ‘read’ people better and to design better initiatives, 
which build on underlying psychological insights.  The first step, they say, is to 
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‘read the mind’ of the consumer (although they may not use these exact words) 
in order to ascertain which sections of society (or indeed all of it) are ready for 
change.  In order to do this, they say we must access the underlying attitudes of 
the public to climate change and sustainable living.  An attitude is classically 
defined as ‘a mental and neural state of readiness organised through experience, 
exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all 
objects and situations with which it is related’ (Allport, 1935, p.810).  This 
mind reading might seem to be very difficult, but an extraordinary number of 
influential people and organizations think it is possible, and even relatively easy 
(you just have to ask the public to report their attitudes in carefully constructed 
surveys). 
Take, for example, the arguments of Leahy (2007), the then CEO of Tesco 
(the multinational supermarket chain), when he announced a call to arms to 
tackle the problem of climate change.  His message was simple.  He said that 
‘The green movement must become a mass movement in green consumption.’  
In order to achieve this goal Leahy argued that ‘we must empower everyone - 
not just the enlightened or the affluent.’  He believed that the market was ready 
for this green consumer ‘revolution’, and his proposed solution was to break 
down the barriers of price and information.  In other words, he was arguing, 
from a marketing and business point of view, that we must make green choices 
affordable and give the consumer the right information in the supermarket itself 
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to make informed decisions to produce a ‘revolutionary’ change in our patterns 
of consumption.  He argued that ‘Customers want to do more in the fight 
against climate change if only we can make it easier and more affordable’, and 
pointed to numerous market research surveys, which seemed to support his 
conclusion.  Various surveys reported that ‘70% of people agree that if there is 
no change in the world, we will soon experience a major environmental crisis’ 
and ‘78% of people say that they are prepared to change their behaviour to help 
limit climate change (Downing and Ballantyne, 2007). These sorts of findings 
are very consistent.  Thus, the British Social Attitudes survey (2012) revealed 
that 76% of people ‘believe climate change is happening and that humans are, at 
least partly, responsible.’  More recently, the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (2015) in the U.K. found that 66% of people ‘reported feeling very or 
fairly concerned about climate change’ based on a survey using 1,981 face-to-
face home interviews. 
 So Leahy was basing his planned initiative, which was the carbon labeling 
of Tesco products, on the reading of consumer minds (‘they were prepared to 
change their behaviour’ etc.).  Similarly, the UK government, in the guise of 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), started from the 
very good assumption that ‘Policy action needs to be rooted in understanding 
and awareness of consumer behaviour’ (2008, p. 22).  They argued that we must 
focus on people’s ability to act and people’s willingness to act, and then they 
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too engaged in mind reading.  ‘Many people are willing to do more to limit their 
environmental impact, they have a much lower level of understanding about 
what they can do and what would make a difference’ (2008, p.28).  Having read 
the mind of the consumer, and assessed the ‘mental and neural state of 
readiness’ in Allport’s words (identifying ‘a positive underlying attitude to the 
environment’ in this case), they then carried out various segmentation analyses.  
These analyses were used to segment the population into identifiable groups 
with different socio-economic profiles, consumer habits and patterns of media 
consumption, and various campaigns were then planned aimed at each of the 
segments.  However, few of these social marketing campaigns had the intended 
outcomes (see Corner and Randall, 2011). 
So why might this be?  We would like to suggest a very simple 
hypothesis: we would argue that it is more difficult than it might appear to read 
the minds of consumers because consumers do not have a mind; they have two.  
There is mounting evidence that people have two distinct cognitive systems 
each with its own properties and mode of operation, with one of these systems 
not open to introspection (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman calls these systems – 
System 1 (the fast, automatic and largely unconscious system) and System 2 
(the slower, more deliberate and reflective, conscious system). This could be the 
reason why many initiatives aimed at behavioral adaptation to climate change 
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(and very expensive campaigns at that in terms of both time and money) have 
failed.  They have made the wrong basic assumption about human beings. 
This hypothesis could help explain a number of things.  Consider first one 
of the core problems in the attitude-behaviour literature.  Why do people report 
positive attitudes about the environment, but then do very little to ameliorate the 
effects of their own lifestyle on the environment – the so-called ‘value-action’ 
gap?   This ‘value-action’ gap occurs emerges repeatedly in the research 
literature in the area of consumption and elsewhere in a range of countries.  For 
example, Aertsens et al. (2009) noted: ‘While most consumers hold positive 
attitudes towards organic food (Magnusson et al, 2001, Saba and Messina, 
2003, Kihlberg and Risvik, 2007), the proportion of consumers purchasing 
organic food on a regular basis remains low, with market shares of organic 
products in European countries, varying from below one percent in some 
Southern, Central and Eastern European countries to over 5% (Sahota, 2009; 
Padel et al, 2009)’ (Aertsens et al, 2009, p. 1140).  Similarly the Swedish 
researchers Roos and Tjarnemo (2011) wrote ‘While a large proportion of the 
population has positive attitudes towards caring for the environment, these 
positive attitudes are not always translated into actual behaviour.  Sales of 
organic food products are low’ (2011, p.983).  Vermeir and Verbeke (2006) say 
that ‘initiatives like sustainable organic food, product free from child labor, 
legally logged wood, and far-trade products often have market shares of less 
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than 1% (MacGillivray, 2000).  This is at least partly due to the attitude-
behaviour gap: attitudes alone are often a poor predictor of behavioural 
intention or market place behaviour (Kraus, 1995; Ajzen, 2001). 
There are clearly different ways of attempting to resolve this ‘value-
action’ gap.  You could assume that you have a good measure of underlying 
attitude but what you need to do is to add other psychological components into 
the model, like subjective norms (beliefs about how others will behave) and 
perceived behavioural control (whether you think that your behaviour will make 
a difference) in an attempt to boost its predictive power (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980; Ajzen, 1985, 1991).  Alternatively, you can consider other economic, 
marketing or commercial features of products (like price, quality, convenience, 
and brand familiarity, see Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006, p. 171) that may impact 
on consumer choice and factor those into the model in an interactive way. 
However, there is, of course, another possibility, which is that perhaps we 
have been measuring attitudes incorrectly in the first place, or the wrong sort of 
attitudes.  Indeed one might question whether our ‘mental and neural state of 
readiness’ is open to introspection, and whether we could ever hope to report it 
accurately in surveys.  Allport himself seemed to show some awareness of this 
in his classic 1935 volume.  He wrote ‘The meagreness with which attitudes are 
represented in consciousness resulted in a tendency to regard them as 
manifestations of brain activity or of the unconscious mind. The persistence of 
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attitudes which are totally unconscious was demonstrated by Muller and 
Pilzecker (1900)’ (Allport 1935, p.801).  He clearly did not rule out the concept 
of the unconscious attitude but chose to focus exclusively on the measurement 
of attitudes with self-report questionnaires.  One of the authors has argued 
elsewhere (Beattie, 2013) that his reasons for this particular focus were both 
academic and highly personal.  Academically, he had been clearly impressed by 
Likert’s early research on the measurement of racial attitudes using objective 
self-reports (the observable data that the new science of psychology craved).  
However, at a more personal level, it is clear from his autobiography that he 
was appalled by Freud’s attempt to psychoanalyze him on his visit to Vienna in 
1920.  Allport told Freud a story about a boy on the tram he had just observed 
who was obsessed with dirt: Freud with his ‘kindly therapeutic eyes’ then asked 
Allport whether he was the little boy in the story. Allport later argued that 
‘psychoanalytic excess’ (what Freud in his view was culpable of that afternoon 
in Vienna) must be avoided at all costs and that we should not delve too deeply 
into the human psyche without first considering more manifest motives.  
Allport’s legacy, both academic and personal, then defined attitude 
measurement in psychology, and related disciplines, for many decades to come.  
But interest in ‘the meagreness with which attitudes are represented in 
consciousness’, in other words ‘implicit cognition’ and ‘implicit attitudes’, has 
been growing in the past few years, and this could lead us to think very 
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differently about the ‘value-action’ gap.  This research might one day tell us that 
the ‘value-action’ gap does not actually exist because we have been measuring 
and factoring in the wrong measure of ‘value’ in the first place.  In an 
international bestseller, the Nobel laureate and behavioural economist Daniel 
Kahneman (2011) has made a very convincing case for the central role of these 
implicit and automatic processes in everyday life.  Take a very simple example, 
imagine looking at an angry face – as quickly as you recognise the gender of the 
person or the colour of the person’s hair, you have decoded the facial 
expression.  This is System 1 thinking – it is automatic, unconscious and fast.  A 
multiplication task, on the other hand, is much slower and more deliberate; it 
requires effort and is conscious.  This is ‘System 2’ thinking in Kahneman’s 
terminology.  In everyday life, System 1 is always active, dealing with many of 
the routine aspects of everyday life.  Kahneman characterises System 1 as a 
‘workaholic’ and System 2 as sometimes a bit lazy (‘harsh…but not unfair’, 
according to Kahneman, 2011, p.46).  System 1 often jumps rapidly to 
conclusions, but System 2 does not always check the validity of the conclusions, 
even when it would be relatively easy to do so.  The two systems work on 
different principles, System 1 works on the principle of associative activation – 
‘ideas that have been evoked trigger many other ideas, in a spreading cascade of 
activity in your brain.  The essential feature of this complex set of mental events 
is its coherence.  Each element is connected, and each supports and strengthens 
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the others’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.51).  System 2 uses more propositional and 
logical reasoning. 
Kahneman uses the example of ‘bananas - vomit’ to show how System 1 
works in terms of spreading activation.  Our minds automatically assume a 
causal connection between the two words, producing within us an emotional 
response, and changing the state of our memory so that we are now more likely 
to recognise and respond to objects and concepts associated with sickness and 
nausea.  We are, for example, more likely to complete the frame ‘s-ck’ as ‘sick’ 
rather than as ‘sock’ or ‘suck’, having been unconsciously primed with the 
paired concepts of ‘bananas’ and ‘vomit’, all because of this associative 
‘machine’ underpinning System 1 thinking. Kahneman argues that as human 
beings we do not necessarily understand the causes and operations of our own 
cognitions and behaviour because of this fundamental division in our cognitive 
processes.  ‘When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the 
conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to 
think about and what to do.  Although System 2 believes itself to be where the 
action is, the automatic System 1…is effortlessly originating impressions and 
feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices 
of System 2’ (2011, p.21).    
Greenwald (1990) has considered the accumulated effects of all of this 
associative activation for attitudes, our ‘mental and neural state of readiness’, 
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and argued that we may well have implicit attitudes formed on such basic 
processes that are not available to introspection and are indeed unconscious.  
We may believe that we have a positive attitude to bananas because we think 
that they are healthy and nutritious, but our associative experiences may provide 
us with a very different implicit attitude to them (and Seligman, 1970, famously 
demonstrated that you only need a small number of negative experiences to 
make this happen).  The problem with this theorising about implicit attitudes 
was that we had no way to access implicit attitudes or measure them reliably, 
until Greenwald developed a reaction time based task to measure associative 
connections called the Implicit Association Test or IAT (Greenwald, McGhee 
and Schwartz, 1998).  The basic premise is that when participants categorise 
items into two sets of paired concepts, then if the paired concepts are strongly 
associated, participants should be able to categorise the items faster, and with 
fewer errors, than if they are not strongly associated. 
In some domains, consciously reported explicit attitudes and implicit 
attitudes measured through speed of association are correlated (although the size 
of the correlation does vary), but in many other domains, there seems to be little 
or no correlation between the two measures and this has led Greenwald and 
Nosek (2008) to suggest that explicit and implicit attitudes can be ‘dissociated’.  
When it comes to climate change, there appears to be no significant correlation 
between implicit and explicit measures, this time in terms of attitude to carbon 
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footprint (Beattie and Sale, 2009).  Some argue that this is not that surprising 
and that explicit and implicit attitudes reflect the two very different information-
processing systems described by Kahneman and others with different processes 
of acquisition.  Implicit attitudes are based on a slow-learning associative 
system whereas explicit attitudes are based on a fast learning system, which 
uses higher-level logic and symbolic representations (Sloman, 1996).  Rydell et 
al. (2006) have also shown that you can change implicit and explicit attitudes 
with different sorts of information.  Consciously accessible verbal information 
about a target changes the explicit attitude towards that target, whereas 
subliminally presented primes, ‘reflecting the progressive accretion of attitude 
object-evaluation pairings’, changes the implicit attitude towards them.  You 
can even change implicit and explicit attitudes in opposite directions by using 
associative information below the level of conscious awareness to change 
implicit attitudes, and consciously processed verbal material (in opposition to 
this) to change explicit attitudes.    
So what are the possible implications of this ‘divided self’, of not having 
one but two underlying types of attitude, for behaviour in general, and more 
specifically for consumer behaviour in the context of the threat of climate 
change?  Both types of attitude can be relevant for behaviour, but under 
different sets of circumstances and this is what the empirical research seems to 
suggest.  Self-report attitudes may predict behaviour under certain situations, 
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especially when people have the motivation and the opportunity to deliberate 
before making a behavioural choice, (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton and Williams 
1995), but they are less good at predicting spontaneous behaviour under time 
pressure (Freise, Wanke and Plessner 2006; Beattie, 2010, Beattie and Sale 
2011), or when consumers are under any sort of cognitive or emotional load, 
(Gibson 2008; Hoffman, Rauch and Gawronski 2007).  Unfortunately, time 
pressure, cognitive load and the absence of any opportunity to deliberate, 
characterises much of everyday supermarket shopping (Beattie and Sale, 2011).  
Supermarket shopping is rarely found to be a slow, deliberate, reflective 
process, the shopper passes about 300 brands per minute (Rundh 2007) and 
each individual choice is often quick and automatic (Zeithaml 2008).  In such 
contexts, unconsciously held implicit attitudes might be a better predictor of 
actual consumer behaviour than explicit attitudes, where an implicit attitude is 
defined as ‘the introspectively unidentified…trace of past experience that 
mediates R’ [where R is the response – the favourable or unfavourable feeling, 
thought, or action towards the social object] (Greenwald and Banaji 1995: 5).  
In other words, habitual consumer behaviour without much opportunity or 
motivation to deliberate might be driven by processes not open to introspection 
and therefore not picked up by self-report measures.  They require a different 
sort of measure.  In the words of Greenwald and Banaji (1995: 5) 
‘Investigations of implicit cognition require indirect measures, which neither 
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inform the subject of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerning 
it’. 
The concept of implicit attitude gives us a different way of thinking about 
the motivational basis for human action and could be a critical element in the 
fight against climate change.  Implicit, rather than explicit attitudes may well be 
underpinning everyday habitual consumer behaviours.  Such behaviours may be 
‘sticky’, in sociological jargon (Downing and Ballantyne, 2007) because 
attempts to change attitudes and behaviour just focus on certain types of 
message, ignoring the associative networks of the implicit system.  Recently, we 
have been investigating how implicit attitudes relate to how we process 
information relevant to climate change, assuming that the processing of relevant 
information is the start point of the whole process of behavioural change (Blair 
et al, 2009).  There are many persuasive messages available about climate 
change, but what happens if people do not seem these sorts of messages? 
(Beattie et al, 2011)  In one study we attempted to determine how eye 
movements towards or away from iconic images of environmental damage and 
climate change are affected by explicit versus implicit attitudes.  We did this by 
projecting slides onto a computer screen, each slide containing three images, 
one positive image of nature, one negative image of climate change and 
environmental damage, and one neutral image (things like pictures of cups, 
plates and other everyday objects).   We found that people do not focus 
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inordinately on the negative images of environmental damage when there are 
other positive images and neutral images available.  They usually look less than 
40% of the time at the negative images.  However, very importantly those with 
strong positive implicit attitudes to carbon footprint were significantly more 
likely to focus on the negative images of environmental damage and climate 
change than the positive images.  We also found that this even occurs in the first 
200 milliseconds of viewing the slide.  Those with a positive implicit attitude to 
low carbon footprint products looked more at the negative images of climate 
change and environmental damage in the first 200msecs compared with those 
with less strong positive implicit attitudes to low carbon footprint products.  
Measures of explicit attitude did not, however, predict patterns of eye 
movement towards the negative images in this way.  It would seem that those 
who have strong implicit pro-low carbon attitudes are primed to attend to these 
sorts of images, whereas those with strong explicit attitudes are not (they 
actually look less. 
More recently, Beattie and McGuire (2015) considered the relationship 
between explicit and implicit attitudes and visual fixation of carbon labels on 
products.  They found that there was no significant relationship between how 
positive the explicit attitude to carbon footprint was and the overall amount of 
attention devoted to the carbon label and no effect was found either with our 
measure of implicit attitude.  However, there was a significant statistical 
 
                                 
 
 
 
                                 
 
 
 
21 
association between our measure of implicit attitude and the target of the first 
fixation.  Those individuals with the most positive implicit attitude were more 
likely to fixate first on the carbon footprint information (rather than ‘energy’ or 
‘price’) compared with those with a more negative implicit attitude.  Those with 
the most positive implicit attitude had a mean of 7.0 first fixations on carbon 
footprint whereas those with the least positive implicit attitude had a mean of 
4.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This association did not, however, occur 
with explicit attitude.  Those with the most positive explicit scores had a mean 
of 5.3 first fixations on carbon footprint whereas those with more negative 
explicit attitudes had a mean of 6.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This 
difference was both in the wrong direction and non-significant. So again we 
find evidence that measures of implicit attitude, but not measures of explicit 
attitude, predict patterns of unconscious eye movements. 
Of course, these studies are about visual attention rather than choice but it 
is the actual behavioural choices that people make rather than merely what 
people notice that is the critical issue when it comes to climate change.  
However, one domain where we have explored actual choice is that of racial 
bias in recruitment.  In this research, we showed that, although the vast majority 
of people report having no preferences either way in terms of race or ethnicity 
(essentially ‘neutral’ attitudes), when implicit bias is measured through the IAT, 
focussing on the associative connections between the target categories 
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(Black/White) and the attribute categories (good/bad), the majority of our 
sample had an implicit pro-White bias.  Our White participants, it seems, had a 
strong pro-White bias.  Furthermore, implicit bias measured in the IAT 
predicted shortlisting decisions in an (experimental) job selection task in a way 
that explicitly reported attitude did not.  The fact that the vacancies in this 
experimental task were all from that most liberal of institutions, a university 
(the positions being both academic and administrative), make the results even 
more striking (See Beattie, 2013; Beattie, Cohen and McGuire, 2013; Beattie 
and Johnson, 2012). 
This research opens up the possibility that we may have implicit attitudes 
at odds with what we report (and indeed at odds with how we think about 
ourselves), which can nevertheless influence our everyday decisions.  So the 
question remains, to what extent do these implicit attitudes predict consumer 
choice (given the importance of consumption to climate change)?  In a very 
simple study, Beattie and Sale (2011) had found that when participants were 
asked to select either a high carbon or low carbon goody bag at the end of an 
experiment measuring attitudes, those with a strong pro-low carbon implicit 
attitude were more likely to select the low carbon goody bag, but only under 
time pressure.  Very similar results had been reported by Friese, Wanke and 
Plessner (2006) who also found that implicit attitude predicted the choice of a 
gift (a ‘generic’ gift versus a ‘branded’ gift) for taking part in the experiment, 
but again only under time pressure.   These results are interesting, but of course, 
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tell us very little about how people will behave in a real consumer choice 
situation for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in terms of what might be called 
broad ecological considerations, consumer products are characterised by a 
number of different dimensions (brand, value, taste, health features, 
environmental implications etc.), all operating simultaneously, which could 
impact on consumer choice at both the associative and more rational levels.  
Advertising is used to build brands (be they well-known brands, luxury brands, 
organic or eco brands, or value brands) in an associative manner (Aaker and 
Biel, 2013), and when it comes to consumer choice under time pressure even 
when System 1 might be more active, these other associations might swamp any 
implicit associations to do with our attitudes to carbon footprint.  Secondly, in 
terms of experimental considerations, in both Friese et al. (2006), and Beattie 
and Sale (2011), the choice of the reward was left until the very end of the 
experiment.  At this point, it might have been apparent to participants that the 
experiment was measuring attitudes to certain attributes of products, and might 
have produced some demand characteristics about what was or was not 
appropriate behaviour. 
Of course, notwithstanding these points, both studies did suggest that 
time pressure is a critical variable in this domain and that implicit attitudes 
might be more predictive of behaviour when time is not freely available and 
when there is certainly little opportunity to deliberate.  This may have particular 
relevance for consumer choice especially in supermarkets where much everyday 
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shopping occurs in advanced Western nations.  These kinds of considerations 
formed the basis for the present study, where we study consumer choice of real 
brands as a function of both time and as a function of both implicit and explicit 
attitude.  Our aim is to investigate what sorts of factors determines choice, and 
whether the ‘divided self’ of human beings (at least in terms of System 1 and 
System 2 thinking) has any relevance for our culture of consumption and our 
ability to adapt to face the threat of climate change.  Here, we also 
experimentally investigate whether carbon footprint information has any effect 
on consumer choice.  There is recent evidence from Finland that it can influence 
consumer choice at least on meat products (Koistinen, Pouta, Heikkila, 
Forsman-Hugg, Kotro, Makela and Niva, 2013).  In Australia there is evidence 
that carbon labelling, particularly using colour-coded carbon footprints (with a 
green footprint denoting ‘below average carbon emissions’ and black denoting 
‘above average’) can influence actual shopping behaviour, but the effects are 
not particularly large (high carbon decreasing by 6%; low carbon increasing by 
4%), unless paired with price.  But how would carbon label interact with the 
other information labels on products (see Gadema and Oglethorpe, 2011) and 
would it relate in any way to our measures of explicit or implicit attitude?  
Further, can we find any evidence of ‘dissociation’ in these attitudes towards 
the environment, which may help explain the relative inaction of the consumer 
towards climate change, and which attitudinal variables might predict a 
behavioural response to the various labels?  
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Method 
Stimuli 
Ten products were selected for this study.  These were everyday products, 
which would be central to any weekly shop.  The products chosen were: 
breakfast cereal (bran flakes), bread, cheese, coffee, fabric conditioner, ice 
cream, orange juice, soup, toilet roll and washing up liquid.  These products 
have a variety of information labels on the front of the products. The number of 
these informational labels do vary from product to product, and depend to a 
certain extent on the price and brand of the product, with the more expensive 
products having either more information labels or more of their surface area 
covered by image, logo or icon.  For example, the Sharpham Park Morning 
Multi Flakes (as sold in the U.K.) is an expensive brand of cereal (a ‘luxury’ 
brand in our jargon).  It retails at £2.99 (compared with £1.38 for a 
supermarket’s own brand, in other words more than double the price).  It 
contains the following information: 
1. Name of product (‘Morning Multi Flakes’). 
2. Image of product. 
3. Name of brand (‘Sharpham Park’). 
4. Source of product (‘British Grown Grains’). 
5. Health relevant information (‘naturally high in fibre….’). 
6. Product description (‘Deliciously crispy, light multigrain rice flakes…’). 
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7. More product description (‘No wheat grains’). 
8. Nutritional information. 
9. Size/weight of product (‘375 grams’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Sharpham Park Morning Multi Flakes. 
 
On the other hand, the cheapest (bran flakes) breakfast cereal – the Asda 
‘chosen by you’ brand (retailing at £1.38) contained the following information: 
1. Name of product (‘Bran Flakes’) 
2. Image of product 
3. Name of brand (‘Asda Chosen by you’) 
4. Health relevant information (‘Bran enriched wheat flakes, fortified with 
vitamins….’). 
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Figure 2: Asda ‘chosen by you’ bran flakes. 
 
In the case of the washing up liquid, ‘Town Talk Polish Co ltd’ is a luxury 
brand that retails in the UK at £4.15, which compares with 80p for the 
supermarket’s own brand.  It contained the following information, which 
covered a significant surface area of the product: 
1. Name of product (‘Washing up liquid’) 
2. Name of brand (‘Town Talk 1895 Polish Co ltd’) 
3. Image of a man with a top hat doing the dishes 
4. Product description (‘ Superior’)  
5. Scent of product (‘basil and lime’) 
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Figure 3: Town Talk Polish Co ltd washing up liquid. 
 
The cheapest washing up liquid used in this study, the ‘Tesco’ own brand 
contained the following information: 
1. Product description (‘Original’) 
2. Name of brand (‘Tesco’) 
3. Name of product (‘Washing up liquid) 
4. Image of a white casserole dish surrounded by bubbles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Tesco’ own brand washing up liquid. 
 
For each product we selected four variations – luxury (the most expensive), 
well-known brand (brands like Heinz, Kelloggs, Hovis etc.), value (the cheapest 
alternative, invariably a supermarket’s own brand) and organic/eco (identified 
as either ‘organic’ or ‘eco’ on the product itself).  So, for example, in the case of 
the coffee,  the luxury brand selected was ‘Starbucks’ the well-known brand 
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was  ‘Lavazza’, the value brand selected was ‘Tesco’, and the organic/eco brand 
was ‘Café Direct’ (see Figure 5).  
 
 Luxury Well-known brand Value Organic/eco 
 
 
Coffee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: An example of the images selected for coffee. 
 
 
The price of each product was then superimposed onto the image of the 
product; price was always represented in white numbers on a black circular 
background.  The positioning of the price sticker was always in the same 
position across the four individual products in that set.  So for example, in the 
case of cheese, the price sticker was superimposed on the bottom left-hand 
corner of the product.  When it came to bread, in each case the sticker was 
superimposed on the top right-hand corner.  The prices superimposed on the 
images of the products were always the actual prices.  The luxury brands were 
always the highest in price, then organic/eco, then the well-known brands 
followed by the value brands. All of the original details on the product remained 
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the same and were not altered in any way, rather information was merely added 
to them. 
As well as the addition of price information, the carbon footprint value 
for each item was also superimposed onto the front of each product.  Our 
intention for carbon footprint was to manipulate carbon footprint information in 
order to test experimentally its effects on consumer choice.  The question is can 
carbon footprint information influence consumer decision making.  This is a 
very important theoretical and practical issue for many businesses concerned 
about climate change.  A core consideration was to vary carbon footprint in a 
systematic way by beginning with the actual carbon footprint of the product 
(derived from a variety of sources from both government and commercial 
databases) and then recalculating three additional values using this as the 
baseline in order to generate two high and two low carbon footprint values.  For 
example, in the case of ‘soup’ we started with 186 grams CO2 for a standard can 
of ‘generic’ soup.  This was represented with a ‘186g’ on a black footprint and 
assigned arbitrarily to the value version of the product.  This figure was then 
halved to generate a lower carbon footprint value (93g CO2).  This was 
represented with a ‘93g’ on a green carbon footprint and assigned arbitrarily to 
the well-known brand version of the soup.  Then 10% was subtracted from this 
value to generate the lowest carbon footprint value.  This was represented with a 
‘83g’ also on a green background.  Finally, 10% was added to the starting value 
which generated the highest carbon footprint value (here represented by ‘204g’ 
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on a black background).  This was arbitrarily assigned to the organic/eco brand 
of the soup.  In the case of the other products the high and low values were 
assigned arbitrarily to the different versions of the products (luxury, well-known 
brand, value and organic/eco) with the only constraint being that each of the ten 
products had to have an equal number of high and low carbon footprint labels 
attached (5 of each in the final tally). The images of the various products 
complete with the added carbon footprints and price stickers were then placed 
on a white background and laminated, creating a series of flash cards.  There 
were 40 flash cards in total. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: An example of the ‘Heinz Classic Cream of Tomato Soup’ with 
a price sticker at the bottom right corner and a low carbon footprint in the top 
left corner. 
 
It is important to emphasise that these stimuli were very different to those 
used by Beattie and McGuire (2015).  In this previous study the ‘products’ had 
only rudimentary information and did not really approximate the richness of 
real heavily branded and marketed consumer products. Here we have a very 
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different scenario in that we have used images of real products where the items 
have much more detailed information to compete with carbon footprint, which 
is much more typical of items found in the supermarket.  The question is, in this 
study, would carbon footprint information (now superimposed on these 
products) impact significantly on the actual choice of products in competition 
with these other features like luxury, well-known brand, value and organic/eco?   
The effects of time pressure and no time pressure on product choice was 
also an important aspect of the design of this experiment.  Under no time 
pressure they were given as much time as they needed to make the selection and 
under time pressure they were told to choose an item as quickly as they could.  
The average time spent choosing a product under time pressure was 2.7 seconds 
(with a range from 1.2 to 5.5 seconds) as opposed to 7.3 seconds (range from 
2.0 to 27.8 seconds) under no time pressure.  The time spent choosing under 
time pressure was significantly shorter (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks 
Test, T=0, n=49, p<0.001, 2-tailed test).  It is interesting to note that under no 
time pressure, most choices were still made relatively quickly.  
 
Method 
Attitude measures 
In order to determine participants’ explicit attitudes towards high carbon 
footprint and low carbon footprint, participants completed a computerised 
Likert scale (see Figure 7) and a Feeling Thermometer (see Figure 8).  Here 
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participants rated how ‘warm’ or ’cold’ they felt towards ‘high carbon’ and then 
how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they felt towards ‘low carbon’ where 1 = cold, 3 = neutral 
and 5 = warm (see Figure 8).  In order to calculate a Thermometer Difference 
(TD) score, the high carbon footprint score is subtracted from the low carbon 
score. Thus, a TD scores can range from -4 to +4, with a negative TD score 
indicating that the participant report a preference for high carbon footprint to 
low carbon footprint and a positive TD score indicating that they report a 
preference for low carbon footprint to high carbon footprint.  The more extreme 
the number then the stronger the preference on this measure.  For example, 1 
would represent a mild preference for low carbon footprint, whereas 4 
represents a very strong preference for low carbon footprint. 
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Figure 7: A computerised version of the Likert scale measuring participants’ 
attitudes to carbon footprint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  A computerised version of the Feeling Thermometer scale measuring 
participants’ attitudes towards high and low carbon footprint products. 
 
Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
Participants were also asked to complete a ‘carbon footprint’ Implicit 
Association Test or IAT (Beattie, 2010, Beattie and Sale, 2010, Beattie and 
McGuire, 2012, Beattie and McGuire 2015).  This particular version of the IAT 
is designed to test people’s implicit attitudes to the target categories (high/low 
carbon) by measuring the associative connection between these and the attribute 
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categories (good/bad).  Thus, participants who associate low carbon footprint 
products with ‘good’ and high carbon footprint products with ‘bad’ should 
respond slower on trials where the pairs are ‘good’/’high carbon footprint’ and 
‘bad’/’low carbon footprint’ and faster on trials where the pairs are ‘good’/’low 
carbon footprint’ and ‘bad’/’high carbon footprint’.  The converse should be 
true for participants who associate low carbon footprint products with bad and 
high carbon footprint products with good. 
The operation of the test is very straightforward.  Exemplars from the 
high/low carbon footprint or good/bad categories (e.g. images of energy 
efficient light bulb, pizza, local vegetables or words like ‘happy’, ‘sad’, 
‘glorious’, ‘nasty’ etc.) appear in the middle of the screen.  Participants have to 
sort these exemplars into their respective categories as quickly as possible 
(these categories appear at the top left- and right-hand corners of the computer 
screen).  To sort exemplars into the left-hand category, participants press z (on 
the left-hand side of the keyboard) and to sort exemplars into the right-hand 
category participants press m (on the right-hand side of the keyboard).  In 
blocks 1,2 and 5 participants sort into single categories (e.g. ‘high carbon’ 
versus ‘low carbon’ for the images of pizza etc.; ‘good’ versus bad’ for the 
words like ‘happy’, ‘sad’ etc.) to allow them to familiarise themselves with the 
task.  In blocks 3 and 6 (the shorter practice blocks) and 4 and 7(longer blocks), 
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participants have to assign the exemplars into conjoined categories (‘high 
carbon footprint or good’ versus ‘low carbon or bad’ etc.). 
The computerised versions of the seven trials are shown below in Figures 
9 - 15. This is what the participants actually saw on the computer screen in our 
IAT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Block 1: low versus high carbon footprints.  
 
 
 
 
 
Low Carbon Footprint  r  t ri t High Carbon Footprint 
Good                                                     Bad 
 
 
 
                                 Glorious 
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Figure 10: Block 2: good versus bad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Block 3 - Good or high carbon footprints versus bad or low 
carbon footprints  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Good                                                    Bad 
            or                                                         or 
High Carbon  Footprint                    Low Carbon Footprint 
         Good                                                    Bad 
            or                                                         or 
High Carbon  Footprint                    Low Carbon Footprint 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      Glorious 
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Figure 12: Block 4: Good or high carbon footprints versus bad or low 
carbon footprints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Block 5: high versus low carbon footprints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High Carbon Footprint                   Low Carbon Footprint 
         Good                                                    Bad 
            or                                                         or 
Low Carbon  Footprint                    High Carbon Footprint 
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Figure 14: Block 6 - Good or low carbon footprints versus bad or high carbon 
footprints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Block 7: Good or low carbon footprints versus bad or high carbon 
footprints 
 
 
IAT effect scores (D scores) were computed using the revised scoring 
algorithm devised by Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji (2003).  Using this 
algorithm, researchers: 
1. Exclude trials where latencies are above 10,000 ms. 
2. Exclude trials where over 10% of trials had latencies lower than 300 ms. 
3. Calculate mean response latencies for Blocks 3 and 4, and Blocks 6 and 7. 
         Good                                                    Bad 
            or                                                         or 
Low Carbon  Footprint                    High Carbon Footprint 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Glorious 
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4. Calculate the difference score for Blocks 3 and 4 and Blocks 6 and 7. 
5. Divide the two difference means by their standard deviations. 
6. Average the scores to compute the D score for each participant. 
There was no specific time penalty for errors in this version of the IAT.  If 
participants made a mistake then they had to press the correct key before 
moving on and this additional step represented the time penalty. 
The D score reflects the difference in latencies during the critical trials.  
D score effect sizes are similar to Cohen’s d (Cohen 1988) and usually take the 
form of small, medium and large values of 0.2 (slight preference), 0.5 (medium 
preference) and 0.8 (strong preference) respectively.  Positive IAT effect scores 
reflect a preference for low carbon footprint products, negative effect scores 
reflect a preference for high carbon footprint products (D scores between - 0.2 
and + 0.2 are considered neutral). 
 
Shopping task 
A total of 40 flash cards were laid out on a table.  There were 10 different 
products (bran flakes, bread, cheese, coffee, fabric conditioner, ice cream, 
orange juice, soup, toilet roll and washing up liquid) with four different brand 
variations of each (luxury brand, well-known brand, value brand and 
organic/eco brand).  The four different brands for each product were laid out in 
a row.  The particular order within the row was changed for each new 
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participant.  Each participant was asked to select a choice of items under a 
number of shopping conditions that included shopping alone under time 
pressure (‘Imagine yourself shopping along in a supermarket; you are in a real 
hurry’) and shopping alone but with no time pressure (‘Imagine yourself 
shopping along in a supermarket you are shopping with plenty of time on your 
hands’).  Each condition was randomised between participants to control for 
possible order effects.  Participants had to select 10 products in total.  Once they 
had chosen their first product, they were then asked to select the next and so on.  
All choices were timed on a stop-watch. The order in which they had to choose 
the products was randomised across both conditions. Each participant was asked 
to complete the shopping task for all products under one condition before 
moving on to the next condition.  
 
Results 
(1) Consumer choice and brand with no time pressure: descriptive 
statistics. 
The first focus for the analysis was the relationship between brand and 
consumer choice under no time pressure.  See Tables 1 and 2.  It was 
immediately apparent that the brand chosen most frequently under no time 
pressure was the well-known brand (38.0% of all selections) followed by the 
value brand (32.4%) followed by the organic/eco brand with 17.0% and lastly 
the luxury brand at 12.6%.  
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Table 1: The relationship between consumer choice of brand under no time 
pressure. 
 
 
Brand Percentage of times 
chosen by all 
participants 
Luxury 12.6% 
Well-known brand 38.0% 
Value 32.4% 
Organic/eco 17% 
 
 
There was, however, considerable variation from product to product.  So for 
example, when it came to products like soup (Heinz), toilet roll (Andrex) and 
conditioner (Lenor) the well-known brands were chosen in over 50% of all 
occasions, and these well-known brands dominated consumer choice.  However, 
in other cases the well-known brands were not chosen so frequently.  So, for 
example, in the case of coffee, the well-known brand (Lavazza) was chosen 
only in 18% of cases; in the case or orange juice the well-known brand (Princes) 
was chosen in only 24% of cases.  Value brands seemed to be selected more 
frequently when it came to washing-up liquid (62%) and bran flakes (52%).  
Organic/eco brands were selected most frequently when it came to coffee (32%) 
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and ice cream (24%), but note that the well-known and value brands are still 
selected more frequently in the case of these products.  Luxury brands were 
selected most frequently when it came to orange juice (32%) and ice cream 
(28%).  In both these cases these were the top selection (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Brand choice across all participants under no time pressure 
(percentage choice). 
 
 Luxury Well-known 
brand 
Value Organic/eco 
Bran Flakes 0% 
 
26% 52% 22% 
Bread 10% 
 
44% 28% 18% 
Cheese 2% 
 
44% 36% 18% 
Coffee 14% 
 
18% 36% 32% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
20% 56% 12% 12% 
Ice cream 28% 
 
26% 22% 24% 
Orange Juice 32% 
 
24% 30% 14% 
Soup 16% 
 
58% 14% 12% 
Toilet roll 4% 
 
58% 32% 6% 
Washing up 
liquid 
0% 26% 62% 12% 
Mean 12.6% 38.0% 32.4% 17.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Consumer choice under time pressure: descriptive statistics. 
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Interestingly, under time pressure, the well-known brands became even 
more popular.  Well-known brands were now selected in 42.8% of all cases 
compared to 38.0% under no time pressure.  Value brands were selected 31.4% 
of the time, followed by luxury brands with 15.4% and lastly organic/eco with 
10.4%.  See Table 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3: The relationship between consumer choice of brand under time 
pressure. 
 
 
Brand Percentage of times 
brand was chosen by all 
participants  
Luxury 15.4% 
Well-known brand 42.8% 
Value 31.4% 
Organic/eco 10.4% 
 
Table 3 reveals a number of things.  Firstly, it hints at the power of 
advertising for those brands that have become well-known (Hovis, Kellogg’s, 
Heinz etc.), in that these brands are immediately recognisable and accessible 
under time pressure and when consumers are under time pressure, then the more 
likely they are to choose something they instantly recognise (Jenson and 
Drozdenko, 2008).  The well-known brand of soup was selected most frequently 
of all products (74%) and the same for toilet roll (58%).  See Table 4.  
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Secondly, it demonstrates that the organic/eco brand drops to fourth place under 
time pressure (10.4%), which is lower than the luxury brand (15.4%).  
However, without time pressure, the organic/eco brand is selected more 
frequently (17.0%) than the luxury brand (12.6%).  This would seem to suggest 
that when we change the temporal context of consumer choice, it does influence 
consumer behaviour and that the organic/eco brand becomes more popular 
when there is some time for consideration (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Brand choice across all participants under time pressure 
(percentage choice). 
 Luxury Well-known 
brand 
Value Organic/eco 
Bran Flakes 0% 
 
48% 42% 10% 
Bread 
 
8% 44% 34% 14% 
Cheese 
 
2% 56% 30% 12% 
Coffee 
 
24% 20% 40% 16% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
26% 42% 18% 14% 
Ice cream 44% 
 
16% 20% 20% 
Orange Juice 34% 
 
38% 24% 4% 
Soup 12% 
 
74% 14% 0% 
Toilet roll 2% 
 
58% 38% 2% 
Washing up 
liquid 
2% 32% 54% 12% 
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Mean 15.4% 42.8% 31.4% 10.4% 
 
 
(3) Consumer choice: inferential statistics. 
Statistical analyses focussed on the relationship between time pressure 
and brand choice.  The first analysis considered the relationship between choice 
of organic/eco brand versus the well-known brand under both time pressure and 
no time pressure following our observations above (see Table 5).  Under time 
pressure the well-known brands were chosen more frequently, whereas the 
organic/eco brands were chosen less frequently under time pressure and this 
difference in distribution was significant (X2 = 9.25, d.f. = 1, p< 0.01, 2-tailed 
test). 
 
 
Table 5: The relationship between choice of organic versus well-known brand 
under time pressure/ no time pressure. 
  
 No TP TP Total 
Organic/eco 
 
85 52 137 
Well-known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Total 275 266 541 
 
 
The next comparison considered choice of organic/eco brands versus 
luxury brands under time pressure and no time pressure, as shown in Table 8.  
The analysis suggests that the organic/eco brands were less likely to be chosen 
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under time pressure compared to the luxury brands, which were more likely to 
be chosen under time pressure (X2 = 8.03, df = 1, p< 0.01, two tailed test).  In 
other words, under time pressure, consumers are significantly more likely to 
choose luxury brands and significantly less likely to choose organic/eco brands. 
 
Table 6:  The relationship between choice of organic /eco brands versus luxury 
brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Organic/eco 85 52 137 
Luxury 63 77 140 
Total 148 129 277 
 
 
A number of the statistical comparisons, however, revealed no significant 
differences in terms of the comparisons made.  So, for example, both 
organic/eco brands and value brands are less likely to be chosen under time 
pressure in a similar pattern to each other with no significant difference in 
underlying distribution (X2 = 3.48, df=1, n.s.).  See Table 7. 
 
Table 7: The relationship between the choice of organic/eco brands versus 
value brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Organic 85 52 137 
Value 162 157 319 
Total 247 209 456 
 
 
Similarly, when well-known brands and luxury brands were compared, 
under time pressure and no time pressure, the participants were more likely to 
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choose both the well-known brands and the luxury brands under time pressure 
in a very similar pattern and again there was no significant difference  (X2 = 
0.17, df = 1, n.s.).  See Table 8. 
 
Table 8: The relationship between the choice of well-known brands versus 
luxury brands under time pressure/ no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Well-known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Organic 
 
63 77 140 
Total 253 219 544 
 
 
Next, we compared value brands and well-known brands under time 
pressure and no time pressure.  Although the value brands were more likely to 
be chosen under no time pressure, the well-known brands were more likely to 
be chosen under time pressure.  The differences in terms of absolute numbers 
under the two conditions were not that large and the difference failed to reach 
significance (X2 = 1.05, df = 1, n.s.).  See Table 9. 
 
 
 
Table 9: The relationship between the choice of value brands versus well-known 
brands under time pressure/ no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Value 
 
162 157 319 
Well-Known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Total 352 371 723 
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Similarly, when the choice of value brands and luxury brands were 
compared under time pressure and no time pressure, it was found that the luxury 
brands were more likely to be chosen under time pressure, but again, the 
difference in quantitative terms were not that great and the overall difference 
failed to reach significance (X2 = 1.34, df = 1, n.s.).  See Table 10. 
 
Table 10: The relationship between the choice of value brands versus luxury 
brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Value 162 157 319 
Luxury 63 77 140 
Total 225 234 459 
 
 
 
 
(4): Does carbon footprint influence consumer choice?   
The carbon footprint of each consumer choice is laid out in Table 11. ‘HH’ 
represents the product with the highest carbon footprint assigned (starting value 
plus 10%), ‘H’ represents the product with a high carbon footprint (the starting 
value), ‘L’ represents the low carbon footprint product (half the starting value), 
and ‘LL’ represents the lowest carbon footprint (0.5 of the starting value minus 
10%). 
 
Table 11: Number of high and low carbon items chosen by each participant in 
the sample under no time pressure/time pressure. 
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 No Time Pressure Time pressure 
  
 
(HH) 
 
 
(H) 
 
 
(L) 
 
 
 
 
(LL) 
 
 
(HH) 
 
 
(H) 
 
 
(L) 
 
 
(LL) 
         
Participant 
1 
2 1 3 4 0 4 2 4 
Participant 
2 
2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 
Participant 
3 
3 1 2 4 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
4 
1 3 4 2 1 4 3 2 
Participant 
5 
1 4 4 1 2 2 4 2 
Participant 
6 
3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Participant 
7 
4 1 3 2 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
8 
1 1 5 3 2 1 5 2 
Participant 
9 
2 3 2 3 1 3 4 2 
Participant 
10 
1 3 5 1 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
11 
4 2 3 1 1 1 4 4 
Participant 
12 
1 2 4 3 2 2 3 3 
Participant 
13 
3 3 2 2 3 3 3 1 
Participant 
14 
3 4 2 1 5 1 2 2 
Participant 
15 
2 2 1 5 1 3 5 1 
Participant 
16 
3 1 4 2 4 3 3 0 
Participant 
17 
0 4 4 2 3 5 2 0 
Participant 
18 
3 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 
Participant 
19 
2 1 4 3 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
20 
3 1 5 1 3 3 2 2 
Participant 3 2 4 1 3 1 3 3 
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21 
Participant 
22 
1 2 5 2 2 3 2 3 
Participant 
23 
1 3 2 4 0 2 3 5 
Participant 
24 
3 0 4 3 5 0 3 2 
Participant 
25 
0 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 
Participant 
26 
2 1 3 4 3 1 2 4 
Participant 
27 
4 2 1 3 1 2 4 3 
Participant 
28 
0 1 5 4 4 0 4 2 
Participant 
29 
2 4 3 1 3 2 2 3 
Participant 
30 
2 4 2 2 2 5 1 2 
Participant 
31 
2 0 4 4 3 1 3 3 
Participant 
32 
1 1 5 3 2 0 5 3 
Participant 
33 
1 2 5 2 1 2 5 2 
Participant 
34 
4 0 3 3 4 1 4 1 
Participant 
35 
1 3 4 2 1 4 2 3 
Participant 
36 
0 2 3 5 0 2 5 3 
Participant 
37 
1 2 1 6 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
38 
4 4 0 2 4 3 1 2 
Participant 
39 
2 3 1 4 1 4 2 3 
Participant 
40 
3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Participant 
41 
2 4 2 2 1 3 2 4 
Participant 
42 
5 3 2 0 4 3 2 1 
Participant 
43 
1 1 3 5 3 4 2 1 
Participant 
44 
1 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 
Participant 
45 
2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
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Participant 
46 
1 4 1 4 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
47 
3 1 2 4 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
48 
2 2 5 1 2 3 4 1 
Participant 
49 
0 1 5 4 0 3 4 3 
Participant 
50 
1 3 2 4 1 3 3 3 
 
 
From Table 11 and 12 (below) it should be clear that the carbon footprint of the 
products did influence consumer choice.  Table 12 shows that when there is no 
time pressure, our experimental participants chose low carbon items a mean of 
3.1 times, very low carbon items a mean of 2.72 times, high carbon items a 
mean of 2.2 times and very high carbon items a mean of 1.98 times.  In other 
words, they seem to prefer low as opposed to high carbon items (of course, 
signalled by the green footprint superimposed on the product).  However, in 
addition, they also prefer the less extreme variations within each of these 
categories (the low carbon item was chosen more than the very low carbon item 
and the high carbon product was chosen more than the very high carbon 
product).  Variations within the category were, of course, only signalled by the 
numerical value on either the green or the black background.   Nonparametric 
analyses revealed that the preference for low carbon items over high carbon 
items was significant – with either the full set (‘HH+H’ versus ‘LL+L’) 
compared (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, z = -3.322, n = 39, 
p<0.001, 2-tailed), or focussing just on the less extreme categories items ‘H’ 
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versus ‘L’) (Wilcoxon Test, z = -2.833, n = 44, p<0.004, 2-tailed).  It was also 
significant focussing just on the more extreme category items (‘HH’ versus 
‘LL’) (Wilcoxon Test, z = -2.422, n = 42, p<0.05, 2-tailed).  However, the 
apparent preference for the low carbon items (‘L’) versus the very low carbon 
items (‘LL’) was not significant (Wilcoxon Test, z = -1.212, n= 44, n.s.), neither 
was the choice of high carbon items (‘H’) versus the very high carbon items 
(‘HH’) (Wilcoxon Test, z = -0.812, n = 43, n.s.).  
 When the participants were under time pressure, they chose low carbon 
items a mean of 2.98 times and very low carbon items a mean of 2.58 times, 
high carbon items a mean of 2.28 times and very high carbon items a mean of 
2.16 times.  So again, the participants show a preference for low as opposed to 
high carbon items.  As in the previous case, they seem to choose the low carbon 
items more than the very low carbon items and the high more than the very high 
carbon items but when under time pressure the difference was not as extreme as 
it was when there was no time pressure. Again, nonparametric analyses revealed 
that the preference for low carbon items over high carbon items was significant 
– comparing the full set (‘HH+H’ versus ‘LL+L’) (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs 
Signed-Ranks Test, z = -2.630, n = 38, p<0.05, 2-tailed).  The differences were 
also significant focussing either on the less extreme categories items (‘H’ versus 
‘L’) (Wilcoxon Test, z = -2.362, n = 40, p<0.05, 2-tailed). However, when it 
came to the more extreme category items (‘HH’ versus ‘LL’) the preference for 
low carbon was not significant (Wilcoxon Test, z = -1.317, n = 52, n.s.).   When 
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comparing the preference for the low carbon items (‘L’) versus the very low 
carbon items (‘LL’) this was not significant (Wilcoxon Test, z = -1.563, n= 
4440, n.s.), neither was the choice of high carbon items ‘H’) versus the very 
high carbon items (‘HH’) (Wilcoxon Test, z = -0.657, n = 49, n.s.)..  
 
 
 
Table 12: Mean number of high and low carbon items chosen by each of the 50 
participants under no time pressure/ time pressure. 
 
 No Time Pressure Time pressure 
  
HH 
 
H 
 
L 
 
 
 
LL 
 
HH 
 
H 
 
L 
 
LL 
Mean 1.98 2.20 3.10 2.72 2.16 2.28 2.98 2.58 
 
 
 
 
 
(4): Do measures of explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon footprint relate 
to one another? 
 
Table 13 shows the mean Likert scores, Thermometer Difference (TD) 
scores and D scores for the sample.  The mean Likert score was 3.6, which is 
approximately midway between neutral and a moderate preference for low 
carbon, translating to a slight preference for low carbon.  The mean TD score 
was 1.2, which also represents a slight preference for low carbon.  The D score 
was 0.99, which represents a strong pro-low carbon preference for this 
particular set of high and low carbon items.  The means are set out in Table 13.  
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Table 13: Mean Likert scores, Thermometer Difference (TD) scores and D 
scores for the sample. 
 
 Likert 
(explicit) 
TD 
score 
(explicit) 
D score  
(implicit) 
Mean 3.60 1.20 0.99 
 
 
 
 
Figures 14-16 show simplified distributions of the Likert, TD and D scores in 
which the scores are assigned to just three categories – pro-low carbon (positive 
score above neutral), neutral (‘3’ for Likert; -1 to +1 for TD; -0.2 to +0.2 for D) 
and pro-high carbon (negative score below neutral).  It is immediately apparent 
that on both explicit and implicit measures our participants emerge as pro-low 
carbon, and as before (see Beattie, 2010) the scores on the implicit measures 
suggest that they are even greener (with the clear proviso that this result will 
depend upon the particular stimuli used in the IAT to represent high and low 
carbon products).   
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Figure 16: The underlying distribution for the Likert scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The underlying distribution for the Thermometer Difference scores 
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Figure 18: The underlying distribution for the D scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But do the explicit and implicit measures relate to each other? A Pearson 
product-moment correlation was computed to assess the relationship between 
the Likert and TD scores (explicit measures) and the D score (implicit measure).  
In line with previous research there was no significant correlation between the 
Likert and D scores (r = 0.016, n=50, n.s.).  Neither was there a correlation 
between the TD and D scores (r = 0.198, n=50, n.s.).  This again suggests that 
explicit and implicit measures are ‘dissociated’ in this domain.  Interestingly, 
the Likert and TD scores also did not correlate (r = 0.056, n=50, n.s.), which 
suggests that self-reported attitudes (‘I strongly prefer products with a low 
carbon footprint to a high carbon footprint’ etc.), do not necessarily correlate 
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with participants’ reports of how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they felt towards low/high 
carbon products (see Table 14). 
 
Table 14: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between D scores 
and Likert and Thermometer Difference scores. 
 
 Thermometer 
Difference (TD) 
Likert 
IAT  r = 0.198 r =0.016 
Thermometer 
Difference 
- r =0.056 
 
 
 
 
(6): Does carbon footprint influence consumer choice?   
The next question is whether these various measures of explicit and 
implicit predict choice of low or high carbon products when information about 
carbon label is included on products, which vary in terms of brand and with all 
of the competing marketing information included.  The statistical comparisons 
here consider the number of choices of low carbon products (either ‘L’ or ‘LL’) 
of that set of participants who score strongly pro-low carbon footprint on the 
various measures.  In the case of the Likert scale, this set consists of those 
scoring ‘5’ (‘I strongly prefer products with a low carbon footprint to a high 
carbon footprint’).  Using this criterion, 20% of the sample is identified as 
having a strong explicit attitude to low carbon.  In the case of the Thermometer 
Difference measure, we employed a criterion of +4.  This criterion identifies 
26% of the sample and represents the maximum difference between feeling 
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warm about low carbon and feeling cold about high carbon.  In the case of the 
IAT, the criterion we use is what has become the norm in the literature for 
identifying a strong implicit bias and that is ‘greater than or equal to 0.8’.  It 
should be stressed that this is an arbitrary criterion (Blanton and Jaccard, 2008  
Blanton et al, 2007, 2015) and here identifies 52% of the sample, in other 
words, a much higher proportion than either of the other two criteria used for 
the explicit measures.  The logic of our analysis is as follows: the focus will be 
on a possible bias in selecting low carbon items for those who fall within the set 
of a strong pro-low carbon attitude.  We compare this with any bias in the 
residual sample that does not have a strong pro-low carbon attitude.  If both 
groups come out with a significant bias this would simply reflect that it was a 
general bias towards selecting low carbon items by the overall sample.  
However, if those with a strong positive attitude to low carbon had a significant 
bias towards selecting low carbon items and this trend was not significant for 
those with a less strong attitude, then we would suggest that this reflects some 
meaningful properties of that attitudinal measure for predicting behaviour.  We 
carried out separate analyses when the choice was made not under time pressure 
and under time pressure.  Table 15 shows the behavioural choices of those with 
a strong pro-low carbon attitude (measured by the Likert scale) under no time 
pressure.  Table 16 shows the behavioural choices of those with weaker pro-low 
carbon attitudes (again measured by the Likert scale).  In both cases, the results 
are significant and represent a bias in both groups towards low carbon choices.  
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Therefore, this particular attitudinal measure (the Likert scale) does not 
discriminate in terms of actual behaviour those with a strong pro-low carbon 
attitude and those with a weaker attitude.  
 
Table 15: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude (Likert 
scale) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
67 33 X2  = 11.56, 
df=1, p<0.01, 2-
tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis that 
choice is not 
affected by carbon 
footprint 
information) 
50 50  
 
 
Table 16: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude (Likert 
scale) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
224 176 X2  = 5.76, df =1, 
p<0.02, 2-tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
200 200  
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In Tables 17 and 18, the same comparisons are made when the 
participants are under time pressure.  What is striking from Table 17 is that 
those with a strong pro-low carbon attitude, as identified by the Likert scale, do 
not display a significant bias towards selecting low carbon items, but those with 
a weaker attitude (according to this scale) do.  In other words, both under no 
time pressure and under time pressure, this attitudinal measure would seem to 
have little discriminatory power for predicting actual behaviour. 
 
Table 17: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude (Likert 
scale) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
51 49 X2  = 0.04, df =1, 
n.s.  
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
50 50  
 
Table 18 :The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude (Likert 
scale) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
227 173 X2  = 7.29, df =1, 
p<0.01, 2-tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
200 200  
 
 
 
62 
 
In the case of the Thermometer Difference, we see a very similar pattern.  
With no time pressure comparisons, there is an inherent bias towards choosing 
low carbon items and this is true for those with a strong pro-low carbon attitude 
as measured by the TD and those with a weaker pro-low carbon attitude.  
Hence, the TD does not discriminate the behavioural choice of the two groups.  
In the case of the time pressure, the results were significant, but in the opposite 
direction to that predicted – only those with the weaker pro-low carbon attitudes 
were significantly more likely to choose low carbon products. See Tables 19-22. 
 
 
Table 19: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude (TD) and 
behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
79 51 X2  = 6.02, df =1, 
p<0.02, 2-tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
65 65  
 
 
 
Table 20: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude (TD) and 
behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
291 79 X2  = 121.5, df 
=1, p<0.001, 2-
tailed. 
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Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
185 185  
 
 
Table 21: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude and 
behavioural choice (TD) under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
74 56 X2  = 2.49, df =1, 
n.s. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
65 65  
 
 
Table 22: The relationship between non strong pro-low carbon attitude and 
behavioural choice (TD) under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
207 163 X2  = 5.23, df =1, 
p<0.05, 2-tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
185 185  
 
In the case of the analyses using the IAT, the results are different.  Under 
no time pressure, both groups (strong and weaker pro-low carbon implicit 
attitude) show a significant bias towards choosing low carbon items.  However, 
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under time pressure the strong pro-low carbon group does show a significant 
tendency to selecting low carbon items; the weaker pro-low carbon group does 
not show a significant tendency in this regard.  In other words, when 
participants/consumers are under time pressure (as they are in many everyday 
consumer situation) those with a strong implicit attitude to low carbon are more 
likely to shop in a sustainable way.  From a statistical point of view this is 
interesting because the group identified on the basis of the normative measure 
of strong implicit attitude (0.8 and above) was larger and therefore less 
selective, and less extreme, than the strong group identified by either of the 
other two measures.  This makes the present result all the more interesting and 
significant.   
 
Table 23: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude (IAT) and 
behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
154 106 X2  = 8.86, df = 
1, p<0.01, 2-
tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
130 130  
 
 
Table 24: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude (IAT) and 
behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
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No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
137 103 X2  = 4.82, df = 
1, p<0.05, 2-
tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
120 120  
 
 
Table 25: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude (IAT) and 
behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
150 110 X2  = 6.16, df = 
1, p<0.02, 2-
tailed. 
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
130 130  
 
 
Table 26: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude (IAT) and 
behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 
(H or HH) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
Observed 
frequency 
128 112 X2  = 1.06, df = 
1, n.s. 
Expected 
frequency 
120 120  
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(under the null 
hypothesis) 
 
 
(7): Do either explicit or implicit attitudes to low carbon products predict 
the choice of organic or eco brands? 
 
In the last section, we could see that carbon footprint not only influenced 
consumer choice, but also that attitude to low carbon (either self-reported or 
implicit) seemed to impact on that choice.  One important theoretical question is 
how general the behavioural impact of such underlying attitudes might be.  We 
only measured attitude to low and high carbon products but would this measure 
also predict the choice of organic or eco products?  It is important to remember 
that we randomly assigned carbon footprint to our range of products.  Although 
there may be a relationship between carbon footprint and organic/eco products 
in general, this would not have been the case in this particular experimental 
context, where these two variables were randomly manipulated by the 
experimenters. 
Tables 27-30 show how both implicit and explicit attitudes relate to the 
choice of organic/eco products under conditions of no time pressure or time 
pressure.  These results are extremely interesting.  The first analysis (Table 27) 
shows that of the 26 participants with a strong pro-low carbon implicit attitude, 
22 of them chose one or more organic/eco products, only four of these 
participants did not choose organic/eco products, when there was no time 
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pressure.  This contrasts with a much more even split (13/11) for those with a 
weaker pro-low carbon implicit attitude. In other words, when our participants 
as ‘consumers’ had time to make their selection this act of choice of organic/eco 
products was significantly affected by their underlying implicit attitude.  This 
did not occur when our participants were under time pressure (see Table 28). 
 
Table 27: The relationship between implicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under no time pressure. 
 
 No. of participants 
with strong pro-
low carbon 
implicit attitude 
(D=0.8 or higher) 
No. of participants 
with weaker pro-
low carbon 
implicit attitude 
(D less than 0.8) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
22 13 X2  = 5.51, df = 1 
p<0.02, 2-tailed. 
No organic/eco 
choices 
4 11  
 
Table 28: The relationship between implicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under time pressure. 
 
 No. of participants 
with strong pro-
low carbon 
implicit attitude 
(D=0.8 or higher) 
No. of participants 
with weaker pro-
low carbon 
implicit attitude 
(D less than 0.8) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
12 9 X2  = 0.40, df = 1, 
n.s. 
No organic/eco 
choices 
14 15  
 
 
 
68 
Our measure of explicit attitude to low carbon also significantly predicted 
the choice of organic/eco products, but again only when the choice was not 
made under time pressure.  It must be remembered that our operational 
definition of a strong pro-low carbon explicit attitude was more extreme in 
terms of where it lands on the underlying distribution of scores than the implicit 
criterion, and uniquely identifies just 10 individuals but every single one of 
them chose an organic/eco product when not under time pressure.  This was not 
the case for those with a weaker pro-low carbon explicit attitude (see Table 29).  
However, when the choices were made under time pressure those with a strong 
pro-low carbon explicit attitude still preferred organic/eco products, whereas the 
majority of those with a weaker attitude here chose no organic/eco products.  
However, this difference failed to reach significance (see Table 30).  In other 
words, those who report the strongest attitude to low carbon products (either 
implicit or explicit) have some tendency to choose organic/eco products, but 
only when they are not under time pressure, suggesting that they may need more 
time to process the label and/or reflect on the nature of their choice. 
 
 
 
Table 29: The relationship between explicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under no time pressure. 
 
 No. of participants 
with strong pro-
low carbon 
explicit attitude 
No. of participants 
with weaker pro-
low carbon 
explicit attitude 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
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(5 on Likert scale) (4 or less, Likert) 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
10 25 Fisher’s Exact 
Probability Test, 
p<0.05, 2-tailed 
test.  
No organic/eco 
choices 
0 15  
 
Table 30: The relationship between explicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under time pressure. 
 
 No. of participants 
with strong pro-
low carbon 
explicit attitude 
(5 on Likert scale) 
No. of participants 
with weaker pro-
low carbon 
explicit attitude 
(4 or less, Likert) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
7 14 Fisher’s Exact 
Probability Test. 
n.s. 
No organic/eco 
choices 
3 26  
 
 
 
Discussion 
This study attempted to uncover some of the core psychological factors 
underpinning consumer choice on the understanding that the behaviour of 
consumers is particularly relevant to issues to do with climate change and the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  Indeed, consumer behaviour would 
appear to be one of the major obstacles on the road to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  The multinational Unilever, for example, has introduced a number 
of (very expensive) major initiatives in the last few years to reduce the 
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environmental impact of their goods, but found (rather vexingly) that ‘Our 
greenhouse gas footprint impact per consumer has ….increased by around 5% 
since 2010’ (Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, 2013, p.16).  Consumer 
behaviour seems to have been responsible for this unanticipated increase, rather 
than decrease, in carbon footprint associated with Unilever products. 
This experimental study reported here attempted to answer a number of 
very basic psychological questions.  Firstly, what brand aspects of products 
(well-known brand, value brand, luxury brand, organic/eco brand etc.) predict 
consumer choice?  In addition, what are the implications of time pressure on 
such choices, given that under increasing time pressure there is less opportunity 
for deliberation and reflection?  Secondly, do measures of explicit or implicit 
attitude towards carbon footprint impact on patterns of choice when 
environmental information is available?  What, for example, happens if carbon 
footprint, experimentally manipulated in various ways, is added to products?  
Will this influence consumer choice when this particular type of environmental 
information has to compete with all of the other information that is available on 
products?  How does time pressure impact on any of these realtionships?   
In this behavioural choice study, it was immediately apparent that we, as 
consumer, are very sensitive to both brand information and value in our 
selection of products. The brands chosen most frequently under no time 
pressure were the well-known brands – Heinz, Kellogg’s, Hovis etc. (chosen in 
38.0% of all selections, with four alternatives to choose from) followed by the 
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value brand (32.4%).  Significantly, further down the list were the organic/eco 
brands with 17.0% and lastly the luxury brands at 12.6%.  However, when 
behavioural choice is made under time pressure, this trend became even more 
pronounced and the well-known brands were selected even more frequently 
(pointing to the power of advertising for promoting brand recognition).  Well-
known brands were now chosen in 42.8% of all cases and value brands 31.4% 
of the time (down slightly).  Organic/eco brands were now in fourth and last 
place with only 10.4% of selections. 
This time dimension (so characteristic of much supermarket shopping) 
had a statistically significant effect on consumer choice in terms of the selection 
of well-known brands compared to organic/eco brands.  Under time pressure, 
consumers were also significantly more likely to choose luxury brands and 
significantly less likely to choose organic/eco brands.  Given the social and 
temporal aspects of much supermarket shopping, often characterised by 
significant time pressure, this is not an optimistic conclusion regarding 
environmentally sensitive choices. 
It must be remembered that carbon footprint information was represented 
in a very obvious visual way on our products with colour coded footprints 
(green for below average, black for above average) and they were represented 
on the front of products rather than the backs (see Beattie, McGuire and Sale, 
2010).  This result shows that representing carbon footprint in this way can 
influence consumer choice.  Our participants (with a positive implicit attitude to 
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carbon footprint within this sample) were guided by these colour coded carbon 
footprints but not by the numerical values of carbon footprint, representing the 
gradations of high and low carbon, within them.  There was no statistical 
difference between the two levels of high carbon footprint that were added to 
our products, or the two levels of low carbon fooprint.  Given that most 
countries have not introduced colour-coded carbon footprint but have instead 
opted for numerical values on a plain background, this might well explain why 
these campaigns have up to now not been relatively unsuccessful in promoting 
behavioural change and the selection of the low carbon alternatives (See 
Beattie, 2010, 2012).  
The next question was whether these various measures of explicit and 
implicit predicted choice of low or high carbon products when information 
about carbon label is included on real products, which vary in terms of brand 
and with all of the competing marketing information included.  In the case of 
the explicit measure (the Likert scale), both under no time pressure and under 
time pressure, this attitudinal measure had little discriminatory power for 
predicting actual behaviour.  When not under time pressure, both groups (strong 
and weak pro-low carbon attitude) showed a low carbon bias in terms of 
behavioural choice.  When under time pressure, the weak explicit attitude group 
did display a low carbon preference; the strong group did not, which, of course, 
was exactly the opposite of what was predicted.  In the case of the implicit 
measure, however, the results were different in one important regard.  Under no 
 
 
73 
time pressure, both groups (strong and weak pro-low carbon implicit attitude) 
displayed a significant bias towards choosing low carbon items (as was the case 
with the explicit group).  However, under time pressure, the strong pro-low 
carbon implicit group did show a significant tendency in selecting low carbon 
items; the weak pro-low carbon implicit group did not show a significant 
tendency in this regard.  In other words, when participants/consumers are under 
time pressure (as they are in many everyday consumer situation) those with a 
strong implicit attitude to low carbon are more likely to shop in a sustainable 
way.  Our measure of explicit attitude to low carbon also significantly predicted 
the choice of organic/eco products, but here only when the choice was not made 
under time pressure, suggesting that they may need more time to process the 
label and/or reflect on the nature of their choice. 
In summary, these results give us some insight into some of the variables 
that affect consumer choice and point towards the attitudinal measures that may 
help us predict consumer behaviour that is more sustainable.  Organic/eco 
brands are clearly not the first choice option, particularly under time pressure.  
Some individuals, however, with a strong positive implicit attitude towards low 
carbon are more sensitive to these brands and to carbon footprint information. 
In the case of implicit attitudes measured using the IAT, one might say that it is 
extraordinary that a simple reaction time measure, which simply computes the 
response time in a categorisation task, can predict anything at all in a separate 
domain.  However, the simple measure predicts choice of low carbon items and 
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even predicts the choice of organic/eco products (at least when there is more 
time for the consumer to reflect).  The advantage of this simple measure is that 
participants do not seem quite so able to distort it for reasons of social 
desirability, in order to appear greener than they really are compared to self-
report measures (see Steffens, 2004).  It may, therefore, provide us with a 
simple diagnostic tool to test the public’s actual readiness to go green, in the 
fight against climate change, and this could turn out to be very important 
indeed.  One could imagine redoing the segmentation analyses of DEFRA and 
other leading organisations where one attempted to profile the population in 
terms of both explicit and implicit attitudes rather than relying merely on what 
people say.  
Of course, the research also raises some very general issues about 
whether or not consumers are dissociated in a number of respects, and whether 
two separate (but potentially interacting) systems of unconscious/implicit and 
conscious/explicit attitudes really do exist (see Gawronski, Hofmann and 
Wilbur, 2006; Rydell et al, 2006)).  This is by no means universally accepted in 
the psychological literature; indeed it is currently the subject of much quite 
heated debate (see Blanton et al, 2006, 2007, 2009 for a critique of this position 
and Greenwald, Nosek and Sriram, 2006, McConnell and Leibold, 2009, and 
Ziegert and Hanges, 2009 for some rebuttals).  However, it would seem that in 
some domains, this notion of implicit attitudes, deriving from various 
associative connections and operating unconsciously alongside our more 
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reflective attitudes (and indeed conflicting with them on occasion), might have 
some credibility (Beattie, 2013: Kahneman, 2011).  Such a view, after all, might 
not surprise those psychologists who worked in the 1930’s alongside some of 
the major tobacco companies to promote smoking (subliminally) through the 
association of smoking with societal success, social acceptance, masculinity or 
feminity and confidence.  It might not even have surprised Gordon Allport in 
his early work on racism and ‘the inner conflict’ (Allport, 1954).  It is certainly 
an idea worth exploring further in the domain of consumption and climate 
change.  If we really do have a ‘divided self’ when it comes to our underlying 
attitudes towards the environment, then this could be critical in the battle 
against climate change.  After all, most of us say that we know that we need to 
adapt our behaviour as consumers in the light of the threat of climate change, 
but then actually do nothing.  Until we start to promote low carbon products and 
low carbon lifestyles in a way that impinges on our automatic, unconscious 
system, little may actually change in this regard.  We cannot leave choice of low 
carbon products solely to reason and reflection, it could be far too late.  As 
Kahneman (2011) himself has noted, System 2 (the system of reason and 
reflection) can be very lazy indeed; it leaves a great deal to System 1, and 
System 1 is currently prioritising well-known brands and value brands over 
those with the right environmental properties.  System 1, in the domain of 
consumption, is directing us to choose those things that we have been taught to 
value – big brands (and status) and economical brands (and money) rather than 
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environmental brands.  This may well need to change.  By all means, let us 
continue to write (and read) the editorials in the quality newspapers about 
climate change and what we must all do.  But at the same time let us think about 
how to promote low carbon lifestyles as something to do with a new sort of 
societal status, fun, sexy, necessary, caring, cooperative, clever, perceptive, 
confident, a must have, the next big thing, a new revolution, in a way that 
System 1 might notice.  Moreover, if we have to borrow from the years of 
(chilling) success of the tobacco industry in promoting smoking, and learn from 
the way they used associative networks, then so be it.  At least, we will then 
know that it was good for something.             
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